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CASE COMMENT: MCCAIN V MCCAIN AND
BARTON V SAUVÉ: A NEW APPROACH TO
AUTONOMOUS !
DOMESTIC CONTRACTUAL BARGAINING IN
ONTARIO
Mark Cornish**
This case comment explores the tension between
principles that guide domestic contractual bargaining
and interpretation in Ontario with reference to two
recent trial-level decisions. The courts’ analyses in
McCain and Barton suggest a way to reconcile the
apparent tension between principles of autonomy and
fairness. In light of these decisions, and drawing on the
literature in this area, the paper suggests a two-pronged
approach for courts to adopt when deciding whether to
set aside a domestic contract. This approach attempts to
ensure that courts only uphold domestic contracts that
are negotiated by truly autonomous parties.
!
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INTRODUCTION
The 1975 decision of Dal Santo v Dal Santo1 provides a
clear and succinct statement of the underlying policy for
domestic contracts:2 “It is of great importance not only to
the parties but to the community as a whole that contracts
of this kind should not be lightly disturbed.”3 Drawing on
this policy, the law in Ontario effectively prioritizes the
primacy and finality of domestic contracts, making them
prima facie enforceable with the onus on the party wishing
to set the contract or a provision thereof aside pursuant to
criteria set out in s 56(4) of Ontario’s Family Law Act.4
This framework gives rise to the question: what is the
appropriate balance between the principles of private
autonomy and overall fairness in the context of domestic
contractual bargaining? This paper will consider this
question in the context of two Ontario Superior Court of
Justice decisions: McCain v McCain5 and Barton v Sauvé.6
Drawing on these cases, the paper offers a two-pronged
inquiry for courts in Ontario to consider to ensure that
1

(1975), 21 RFL 117, 1975 CarswellBC 45 (BCSC) [Dal Santo
cited to RFL].

2

For the purpose of this paper, the term “domestic contracts” is
meant to cover marriage contracts and cohabitation agreements, but not
separation agreements. In Ontario, these terms are defined by ss 52, 53,
and 54 of the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F3 respectively. As such,
this paper focusses on contracts made before or during a relationship—
i.e., not at its end.

3

Dal Santo, supra note 1 at para 16.

4

Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F3 [FLA].

5

2012 ONSC 7344, 34 RFL (7th) 82 [McCain].

6

2010 ONSC 1072 [Barton].
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parties involved in domestic contractual bargaining were
indeed autonomous. This determination would, in turn,
assist courts in deciding whether to set aside a particular
domestic contract executed by said parties.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Both McCain and Barton were decided in the context of a
tension between two principles that appear to be at odds
with each other: autonomy and fairness. Autonomy is
understood as the right and ability to make one’s own
decisions and to have those decisions respected and upheld
by others.7 Fairness is the act and process of treating people
equally or in a way that is right or reasonable, usually with
reference to an ostensibly objective set of criteria.
For the purposes of this paper, judicial decisions
that respect parties’ autonomy would uphold their domestic
contracts. Decisions that espouse fairness would more
readily intervene and even set aside domestic contracts
where the court finds that one party did not treat the other
procedurally fairly or because the domestic contract results
in an ostensibly unreasonable or unjust substantive
outcome.
As such, in the context of domestic contracts,
fairness can be broken down into two categories:
procedural fairness and substantive fairness. The Supreme
Court of Canada understands procedural fairness as
ensuring that the process of negotiation and execution of
agreements is fair. The court should ensure that neither of
7

For the purpose of this paper, the most significant of those “others”
are courts.
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the bargaining parties are vulnerable 8 vis-à-vis the other
party or, if one party is indeed vulnerable, that the other
party did not take advantage of that vulnerability.9 In this
vein, procedural fairness would include the opportunity
and ability to negotiate, the provision of full financial
disclosure on behalf of both parties, the absence of threats
or pressure, and the presence of independent legal advice.
Substantive fairness is achieved when “the
substance of the agreement, at formation, complied
substantially with the general objectives of the [Divorce
Act10 or FLA].”11 As such, the more a domestic contract
deviates from the objectives or anticipated outcomes of the
relevant Act, the less substantively fair it is.12 However, a
domestic contract that so deviates may, and should, still be
viewed as substantively fair if there is a valid reason or
justification for it, such as if one party gives up something
to which they would be statutorily entitled in exchange for
a benefit they would not otherwise have.13
8

“Vulnerable” meaning significantly physically, mentally,
emotionally, or financially inferior to the other bargaining party.

9

See Rick v Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10 at para 42 [Rick], citing
Miglin v Miglin, 2003 SCC 24 at para 4[Miglin].

10

Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp).

11

Rick, supra note 9 at para 42.

12

For example, a domestic contract that splits a married couple’s net
family property in Ontario 5% to one spouse and 95% to the other
would very likely be considered substantively unfair because it differs
significantly from the equal (i.e., 50%-50%) property sharing regime
established in s 5 of the FLA.

13

For instance, a contract where one spouse that agrees to partake in
only 25% of the couple’s net family property in exchange for being

CASE COMMENT ON MCCAIN AND BARTON

199

Two appellate-level judgments serve as
exemplifications of these two principles. The majority
decision in Hartshorne v Hartshorne 14 is driven by
autonomy interests while the decision in LeVan v LeVan15
promotes fairness.
In Hartshorne, a wife, after obtaining independent
legal advice, signed a marriage agreement on her wedding
day.16 The agreement significantly limited her entitlement
to property sharing in the event she and her husband
separated in the future. 17 The Supreme Court of Canada
upheld the marriage contract, despite it being signed in a
jurisdiction where the legislation specifies that the courts’
role in division of assets on marital breakdown is fairness
(i.e., British Columbia). 18 Bastarache J, for the majority,
stated:
[I]n a framework within which private parties
are permitted to take personal responsibility
for their financial well-being upon the
dissolution of marriage, courts should be

made a joint tenant owning a portion of the matrimonial home equal to
their spouse could, depending on the value of the home, be viewed as
substantively fair.
14

2004 SCC 22 [Hartshorne].

15

2008 ONCA 388 [LeVan].

16

See Hartshorne, supra note 14 at paras 2, 6.

17

See ibid at paras 5–6.

18

See ibid at para 13.
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reluctant to second-guess their initiative and
arrangement.19
Contrast Hartshorne’s emphasis on private
autonomy with LeVan’s concern for fairness. In LeVan, a
wealthy future husband wanted his future wife to enter into
a marriage contract in an attempt to shield his assets in the
event of separation. 20 Although the future wife initially
received independent legal advice, her future husband sent
her to a lawyer who had connections to his family.21 The
Court of Appeal found that the future wife did not receive
effective independent legal advice and that the future
husband failed to disclose his assets to his future wife
pursuant to s 56(4)(a) of the FLA.22 The Court stated:
Although there is nothing in the governing
legislation that suggests that fairness is a
consideration in deciding whether or not to
set aside a marriage contract, I do not see why
fairness is not an appropriate consideration in
the exercise of the court's discretion in the
second stage of the s. 56(4)(a) analysis. In my
view, once a judge has found one of [the]
statutory preconditions to exist, he or she
should be entitled to consider the fairness of
the contract together with other factors in the
exercise of his or her discretion. It seems to
me that a judge would be more inclined to set
19

Ibid at para 67.

20

See LeVan, supra note 15 at paras 7, 9–11.

21

See ibid at para 26.

22

See ibid at paras 61–62.
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aside a clearly unfair contract than one that
treated the parties fairly.23
LeVan therefore sets up a two-step process for
courts to follow when deciding whether to set aside a
domestic contract in Ontario. The party seeking to have the
domestic contract or provision thereof set aside must show
(1) that one of conditions in FLA s 56(4) exists and, if so,
(2) why the court should exercise its discretion to set the
domestic contract aside (the LeVan process).24 The court is
clear that it is possible and appropriate to consider the
fairness of the domestic contract in the second step of this
analysis.25
The Ontario Court of Appeal in LeVan thus reads
fairness into the exercise of discretion in the FLA s 56(4)26
whilst the Supreme Court in Hartshorne diminishes the
role of fairness in the applicable British Columbia
legislation in an effort to promote individual autonomy.
Later cases from the Supreme Court of Canada, such as
Miglin v Miglin 27 and Rick v Brandsema, 28 arguably
mandate that fairness play a more prominent role when
courts are deciding whether or not a domestic contract

23

Ibid at para 60.

24

See ibid at para 33.

25

See ibid at para 60.

26

Section 56(4) of the FLA does not identify “fairness” as a
consideration for setting aside domestic contracts.

27

Miglin, supra note 9.

28

Rick, supra note 9.
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should be set aside. 29 However, the Supreme Court was
clear that the guidance in Miglin and Rick is applicable to
separation agreements only. 30 The Supreme Court saw
separation agreements as requiring a more exacting test for
review than commercial contracts because they are
“negotiated between spouses on the fault line of one of the
most emotionally charged junctures of their relationship—
when it unravels.”31 As such, both Miglin and Rick have
limited applicability for the purpose of reviewing and
potentially setting aside domestic contracts.32
Therefore, Hartshrone and LeVan set up an
apparent tension between autonomy and fairness 33 that
serves as the backdrop for McCain and Barton.
FACTUAL AND LEGAL SUMMARY: MCCAIN
In an attempt to preserve his family’s wealth, Mr.
McCain’s father required that his children enter into
marriage contracts with their spouses to limit those
spouses’ entitlement to property and spousal support at
29

See Miglin, supra note 9 at paras 4, 67, 73–75, 82–83; Rick, supra
note 9 at paras 1, 40–44, 49.

30

See Rick, supra note 9 at paras 39–40.

31

Ibid at para 40.

32

“Domestic contracts” as defined in note 2 of this paper.

33

Other writers have picked up on this apparent tension. See Carol
Rogerson, “Spousal Support Agreements and the Legacy of Miglin”
(2012) 31:1 Can Fam LQ 13 at 32 (positing autonomy and fairness as
principles that are difficult to balance). See also: Lucy-Ann Buckley,
“Relational Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2015) 29:2 Can J Fam L 251 at 254 (discussing autonomy
and fairness as an ongoing “debate” and “tension”).
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family dissolution, lest his children be disinherited.34 His
son (Mr. McCain), an extremely wealthy business man
worth approximately $500 million dollars, passed on this
information to his wife (Ms. McCain) approximately 15
years into their marriage, and after receiving independent
legal advice, she signed the contract.35 When the parties
eventually separated (after 30 years of marriage), Ms.
McCain sought to set aside the provision of the contract
waiving spousal support and made a claim for interim
spousal support.36
Greer J concluded that the contract was
unconscionable. 37 She found that Ms. McCain had little
choice but to sign the agreement, knowing that her husband
would be disinherited if she refused to sign.38 Further, she
held that Ms. McCain was under subtle and psychological
duress when she signed the marriage contract because her
decision to sign determined whether her husband would
remain an heir to his father’s fortune.39
As a result of these findings, Greer J severed the
provision of the marriage contract that precluded Ms.
McCain from receiving spousal support and ordered

34

See McCain, supra note 5 at paras 4–6.

35

See ibid at paras 13, 57, 65.

36

See ibid at paras 1, 9.

37

See ibid at para 88.

38

See ibid at paras 65–66.

39

See ibid at para 74.
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support in the amount of $175,000 per month in addition to
$2.8 million of retroactive spousal support.40
LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY: BARTON
The parties, Ms. Barton and Mr. Sauvé, entered into a
cohabitation agreement several months before the end of
their 8-year relationship. 41 They discussed their
cohabitation agreement at a time when Mr. Sauvé was
suffering from depression and living on worker’s
compensation due to a work injury. 42 Ms. Barton had
recently received a $2 million inheritance, which she used
a portion of to pay off Mr. Sauvé’s debts. She also made
him the joint-owner of a house she paid for.43 Essentially,
in return for including him on title for the new home, Ms.
Barton asked Mr. Sauvé to sign an agreement limiting his
entitlement to a payment of $70,000 as compensation for
his contribution to the family home in the event of a
separation. 44 When the parties separated, Mr. Sauvé
applied under s 56(4) of the FLA to set aside the $70,000
limitation.45
Blishen J, in upholding the $70,000 limitation as
stipulated in the agreement, noted that the presence of
vulnerabilities do not, without more, evince
40

See ibid at paras 75, 103, 108

41

See Barton, supra note 6 at paras 1, 15.

42

See ibid at paras 20, 55, 66.

43

See ibid at paras 10–12, 15.

44

See ibid at paras 54, 60.

45

See ibid at paras 22, 47.
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unconscionablility, duress or undue influence. 46 She
concluded that although Mr. Sauvé was “a somewhat
vulnerable party… he did receive independent legal advice,
understood the nature and consequences of the agreement
and signed it voluntarily.” 47 Blishen J framed the
discussion of the cohabitation agreement and decision to
have the new home purchased in both parties’ names as a
true negotiation, and one where Ms. Barton was not taking
advantage of Mr. Sauvé. The contract was therefore not
unconscionable, did not involve undue influence, and nor
was it signed under duress—all of which are considerations
under s 56(4)(c) of the FLA.48
Blishen J thus upheld the cohabitation agreement’s limited
allocation of $70,000 to Mr. Sauvé,49 although the court set
aside the waiver of spousal support in the same agreement
pursuant to s 33(4) of the FLA on the basis that it resulted
in “unconscionable circumstances” for Mr. Sauvé.50
ANALYSIS
The outcome of the decisions in McCain and Barton
ostensibly espouse different principles—McCain, in
setting aside the provision of the marriage contract under
review, espouses fairness, while Barton, in upholding the
cohabitation agreement (with the exception of the
46

See ibid at para 66.

47

Ibid at para 67.

48

See ibid at paras 64–67.

49

See ibid at paras 71–72.

50

Ibid at para 87.
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provision waiving spousal support), espouses individual
autonomy.
Although McCain does not use FLA s 56(4) to set
aside the waiver of spousal support, Greer J’s findings of
unconscionability and duress51 demonstrate that concerns
about fairness were paramount. She is sensitive to the
context and underlying power dynamics of the parties at
the time they signed the agreement. This approach thus
follows LeVan insofar as Greer J considers fairness in her
discussion of unconscionability and duress. Indeed,
fairness has a direct bearing on the outcome of her
judgment.52
Blishen J in Barton indirectly considers the fairness
of the agreement as she assesses issues such as the parties’
vulnerabilities and presence of duress.53 However, Blishen
J ultimately upholds the agreement, which suggests she put
more emphasis on respecting the individual autonomy of
the bargaining parties, thus following the Supreme Court’s
approach in Hartshorne. Indeed, Hartshorne is the first
case cited by Blishen J in the portion of her judgment
examining the cohabitation agreement.54

51

See McCain, supra note 5 at paras 65–66, 88.

52

See ibid at paras 54, 83, 88. See especially: “Even the Husband, in
his examination, agreed that the Contract was not fair to his Wife. It is
clear on the face of the Contract that it is unfair, improvident and
unconscionable.” (Ibid at para 88, [emphasis added]).

53

See Barton, supra note 6 at paras 66–68.

54

See ibid at para 41.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, an
examination of Barton that focuses more on the court’s
reasoning and less on the outcome reveals that concerns
about fairness were also relevant, if not vital, to Blishen J’s
decision. For example, she considered the fact that Ms.
Barton paid off all of Mr. Sauvé’s debts,55 bought a new
house in joint tenancy with Mr. Sauvé,56 and engaged in
back-and-forth negotiation about whether to buy the new
house as joint tenants and what the allocation of funds to
Mr. Sauvé should be in the event of separation. 57 These
considerations evince that Blishen J was ensuring that both
parties were treating each other fairly, procedurally, such
that any power imbalance was mitigated by real, nonthreatening negotiation. This is in contrast to McCain,
where there was no real opportunity for Ms. McCain to
negotiate since she was provided with an implicit
ultimatum: “you must sign this contract or I [Mr. McCain]
will divorce you.”58

55

See ibid at paras 11–12, 18, 67.

56

See ibid at paras 15–16, 62, 67.

57

See ibid at paras 54, 67.

58

See McCain, supra note 5 at para 74. Note that although the
pressure to sign the domestic contract stemmed from Mr. McCain’s
father, who threatened disinheritance, Greer J (properly) equally
attributed the pressure to Mr. McCain himself. Mr. McCain could have
refused to ask his wife to sign the contract and dealt with his father’s
threat to disinherit him directly, but he did not do. Thus, by asking Ms.
McCain to sign the contract, to quote Greer J, “the duress was subtle
and psychological, in that [Ms. McCain] appeared to be the key to [Mr.
McCain] remaining as one of his father’s heirs. Of course [Mr.
McCain] did not say ‘you must sign this contract or I will divorce you,’
but that was the underlying stake in it all.”
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Fairness was also key to one aspect of the outcome
in Barton, namely the issue of spousal support. Blishen J
turned her mind to Mr. Sauvé's financial circumstances, his
financial contributions to the relationship, and the fact that
he was unable to return to any meaningful employment due
to physical and psychological disabilities.59 The fact that
Blishen J highlighted and addressed these concerns by
setting aside the waiver of spousal support in the agreement
evince that she was attuned to the circumstances of Mr.
Sauvé, whom she describes as “a somewhat vulnerable
party”, 60 in an attempt to achieve a substantively fair
outcome.
Furthermore, one key factual difference at the time
the parties signed their respective agreements sheds light
on how different outcomes were reached in McCain and
Barton. 61 That key difference is fear of imminent
separation in the event that one party does not sign the
agreement. In McCain, Ms. McCain experienced this fear
when she “was told that if she did not [sign] the contract,
the parties’ lifestyle as a family would greatly suffer.”62
Greer J properly found that Mr. McCain’s implicit message
to his wife was, “You must sign this contract or I will
59

See Barton, supra note 6 at para 87.

60

See ibid at para 67.

61

Note that I am examining only the circumstances at the time the
parties signed the agreement that factored into the courts’ analysis in
each case, and not the position the parties were left in at the time of
separation. A discussion and analysis of how the courts do and/or
should handle the resulting circumstances the parties find themselves
in at the dissolution of the relationship is an important discussion, but
one that is beyond the scope of this paper.

62

McCain, supra note 5 at para 6.
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divorce you.”63 Contrast this with Mr. Sauvé’s situation in
Barton, where the immediate consequence of failure to
sign the cohabitation agreement was not separation, but
rather, a refusal to put him on title for the new house Ms.
Barton was purchasing. Ms. Barton does not threaten the
relationship whereas Mr. McCain does.
The disparity between the consequences for failure
to sign the agreements in each case is a key distinguishing
factor that courts reviewing domestic contracts must be
alive to. This is especially so considering that domestic
contracts are often signed when circumstances between the
parties are favourable—they are either entering into a new
and exciting chapter of their life (i.e., marriage) or are
already happily married or cohabiting. As such, the party
being asked to sign a domestic contract often does not see
the future dissolution of the relationship as a realistic
possibility—a dissolution which would trigger the
provisions of a domestic contract that are not in their best
interest. Similar critiques have been levelled by leading
family law scholars who argue that assessing the fairness
of domestic contracts must take into account the power
imbalances between spouses/cohabiting couples,64 gender
inequalities, and flaws in the parties’ capacity to contract.65
While jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada
63

Ibid at para 74.

64

See Martha Shaffer, “Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme
Court’s Decision in Hartshorne v Hartshorne” (2004) 20:2 Can J Fam
L 261 at 280–288.

65

See Sarah Whitmore, “Deconstructing ‘Economic Man’s’
Application to Marriage Agreements: An Analysis of the Method of
Contractual Enforcement in Hartshorne v Hartshorne” (2010) 29:3
Can Fam LQ 303 at 315.
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has picked up on these nuances in the context of separation
agreements, 66 which have been framed as agreements
negotiated in an “emotionally charged juncture” of a
relationship,67 domestic contracts have not been discussed
in as much detail. 68 McCain and Barton evince that the
more subtle forms of pressure, such as coercion (and even
duress), at play when parties sign domestic contracts in the
prime of their relationship warrant the same degree of
judicial attention as separation agreements—with a focus
on how heart-shaped glasses, rather than heartbreak, may
catalyze and manifest as vulnerability.
Even independent legal advice, which presumably
would bring the risks of a particular domestic contract or
provision thereof to the forefront of the party’s mind, is
often not enough to convince a party to refuse to sign. We
notice this phenomenon occurring in many of the cases
cited in this paper (McCain, Barton, and even Hartshorne
and LeVan) where, despite receiving legal advice, the
parties signed agreements that they later attempted to have
set aside.
PROPOSAL: A NEW FRAMEWORK
The courts in both McCain and Barton struggle with
fairness concerns even though they understand, pursuant to
66

See e.g. Rick, supra note 9 at para 41, citing from Miglin, supra
note 9, Lebel J, dissenting: “the law must be sensitive to the ‘social and
socio-economic realities’ that shape parties’ roles in spousal
relationships and have the potential to negatively impact settlement
negotiations upon marriage breakdown.”

67

Ibid at para 40.

68

Buckley, supra note 33 at 307.
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the Supreme Court’s comments in Hartshorne and
Miglin,69 that domestic contracts should not be set aside
lightly. This struggle may be the product of fairness and
autonomy being posited as a dichotomy, where one
principle appears to be in conflict with the other.70
The courts in McCain and Barton, although not
expressly saying so, are giving primacy to individual
autonomy, while ensuring that the parties are on a level
bargaining plane. If the parties are not on a level bargaining
plane, the courts review the circumstances to determine
what, if any, contractual bargaining occurred to ensure that
no party exploited any inequality in bargaining power
when the domestic contract was considered and eventually
executed. Greer J, alive to the pressures Ms. McCain was
experiencing, including concerns about her husband’s
inheritance and preservation of the family unit,71 properly
concluded that Ms. McCain was under duress and that the
contract itself was unconscionable.72 In other words, Ms.
McCain was not actually an autonomous bargaining party
in the circumstances. Blishen J noted that Mr. Sauvé was a
“somewhat vulnerable party,” but that he was still able to
bargain with Ms. Barton. She also noted that Ms. Barton
did not take advantage of his vulnerabilities or unduly
69

Miglin speaks more directly to waivers of spousal support in
separation agreements, which are subject to different principles and
more exacting tests for review, as discussed above in part (2) of this
paper. See Miglin, supra note 9. Nonetheless, there are portions of
Miglin that espouse individual autonomy in a manner similar to
Hartshorne. See McCain, supra note 5 at paras 69–71.

70

See Rogerson, supra note 33 at 32; Buckley, supra note 33 at 254.

71

See McCain, supra note 5 at paras 4–6, 65–66.

72

See ibid at paras 74, 88.
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influence him. Blishen J correctly concluded that there was
no unconscionability, duress, or undue influence. 73 Put
differently, Mr. Sauvé was an autonomous bargaining
party vis a vis Ms. Barton.
As such, Ontario courts may view fairness and
autonomy not as mutually exclusive principles, but rather
as two guiding principles to set up a two-pronged analysis
at the second step of the LeVan process 74 for deciding
whether to set aside a domestic contract or a provision
thereof: (i) that the goal of court, pursuant to the court’s
policy rationales in Hartshorne and, to a lesser extent,
Miglin, should indeed be to uphold a domestic contract to
foster autonomy, but in so doing, (ii) the court must ensure
the contract is truly the product of two autonomous
parties.75 It is at this second prong where concerns about
fairness ought to be considered. More traditional contract
law concepts that touch on fairness, such as inequality in
bargaining power, unconscionability, duress, and undue
influence, would already have been addressed at step one
73

See Barton, supra note 5 at paras 66–68.

74

I.e., the step where the court considers whether it should exercise
its discretion to set aside the contract after finding that one of the
conditions in FLA s 56(4) exists.

75

To summarize, the two prongs being suggested would fit into the
LeVan process as follows: the party seeking to have the domestic
contract or provision thereof set aside must show that (1) one of
conditions in FLA s 56(4) exists and, if so, (2) why the court should
exercise its discretion to set the domestic contract aside. Under this
discretionary second step, the court would undertake a two-pronged
inquiry to ensure both autonomy and fairness: (i) the court should
indeed uphold the domestic contract under review to foster autonomy,
but in so doing, (ii) the court must ensure the contract is truly the
product of two autonomous parties.
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of the LeVan process (i.e., under FLA s 56(4)(c)). As such,
the focus of the second prong of step two of the LeVan
process would be on procedural and substantive fairness,
as defined in part (2) of this paper. To ensure the parties
were truly autonomous, the court would consider whether
the domestic contract was negotiated in a procedurally fair
manner and whether the contract resulted in a substantively
fair outcome for both parties. While there would not, and
could not, be a definite threshold for a finding of procedural
or substantive unfairness, the more indicia of either form
of unfairness, the more likely a court would be to exercise
its discretion to set aside some or all of the domestic
contract.
At the second prong where fairness concerns are to
be taken into account, the court should be particularly
attuned to the considerations discussed in the final two
paragraphs of the “Analysis” segment of this paper. This
includes (a) assessing implicit threats or fears of the
dissolution of the relationship on behalf of the party being
asked to sign and (b) recognizing that parties entering into
a domestic contract are in love or infatuated with one
another, making them less focused on protecting their best
interests and more concerned with fostering the
continuation of their relationship. The party being asked to
sign may thus be blind to any and all risks they might take
on when signing a domestic contract, even if they receive
independent legal advice.
Further, contextual and structural forms of coercion
and oppression, such as gender inequality, must also be
considered by courts at the second prong. This approach
concurs with suggestions offered by Diana Majury, who
argues that courts reviewing domestic contracts must be
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“willing to recognize system inequality of bargaining
power” and adopt a gender-based approach to
unconscionability. 76 I would take Majury’s analysis one
step further by suggesting that courts not limit assessments
of systemic inequality to considerations of gender, but
rather to utilize an intersectional approach that recognizes
how other systems of oppression, such as racism,
queerphobia, classism, and ableism, also affect domestic
contractual bargaining and fairness.
For example, consider a closeted LGBTQ+ 77
partner who comes from a queerphobic78 family or society
who wants to remain with their supportive intimate partner.
Such an individual may not wish to marry their intimate
partner, given how public the act of marriage is and the
repercussions that may flow from that act. However, this
individual’s intimate partner may, instead of getting
married, wish to enter into a domestic contract mandating
a property sharing scheme similar to the one imposed on
married couples under the FLA. The closeted individual
may be more inclined to sign such a contract, even if it
would result in a financial disadvantage to them, in an
attempt to appease their intimate partner, seeing it as an
alternative to marriage. They may even forgo independent
legal advice in this circumstance, believing it to be
unnecessary because they have an otherwise healthy
relationship or because they do not even want to disclose
76
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their sexuality/relationship status to a lawyer. A court
attuned to these nuances of queerphobia and other systemic
and structural forms of oppression would be better able to
understand how the domestic contract in this example may
not have been negotiated in a procedurally fair manner—
the closeted individual’s reluctance to marry or otherwise
disclose their sexuality/relationship status is likely
inhibiting their ability to negotiate as an autonomous
party.79
As such, courts must not only be attuned to duress,
undue influence, and unconscionability, but also to how
systemic and structural forms of oppression manifest
themselves in intimate relationships in ways that are much
more subtle than in arms-length business transactions. 80
The proposed second prong of the second step of the LeVan
process provides an apt locus for such considerations.
This two-pronged approach largely conforms with
Lucy-Ann Buckley’s conception of a relational-autonomy
approach to spousal support and property agreements—an
approach that focusses on “the social situation of the
individual (including the social connections and pressures
that may affect personal decision making), and the impact
of social forces on the development of personal capacities
79

This is the case notwithstanding that the domestic contract may
otherwise be substantively fair, if it did indeed mirror the property
sharing provisions of the FLA.
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for reflection and action.”81 Buckley prefers a relationalautonomy response to financially disadvantageous or
manifestly unequal domestic contracts that “holds that
individuals must be able to reflect critically on equality
norms, even if they ultimately depart from them, and must
feel that they have a real choice in how they respond to a
particular situation.” 82 The two-pronged approach
suggested in this paper attempts to achieve this by
ensuring, at the first prong, that courts understand that
domestic contracts ought to be respected and upheld to
preserve parties’ autonomy,83 but also, at the second prong,
that the bargaining parties were truly autonomous in that
they had a “real choice” and opportunity to reflect critically
on equality norms, even if they depart from them in
executing or choosing not to execute a domestic contract.
While Buckley has reservations as to how much difference
a relational-autonomy approach would make in practice to
spousal support84 and marital property agreement cases,85
she does end up concluding that it is “normatively
preferable” in the context of family relationships insofar as
it vindicates the importance of emotion and connection in
the decision-making process. 86 The two-pronged inquiry
suggested in this paper simply ensures that courts consider
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and engage with relational autonomy concerns when
deciding whether to set aside a given domestic contract.
Presumptions embedded in many of Bastarache J’s
comments in Hartshorne further underscore the need for
this two-pronged approach. Consider comments such as
“by signing the Agreement, the appellant and the
respondent entered their marriage with certain expectations
on which they were reasonably entitled to rely”87 and “in a
framework within which private parties are permitted to
take personal responsibility for their financial wellbeing”.88 Bastarache J presumes that both parties are fully
autonomous and able to bargain reasonably and rationally.
Whitmore makes a similar observation, noting that
Bastarache J’s analysis assumes that parties conduct “a
rational cost-benefit analysis to maximize their own
utilities . . . weigh[ing] these consequences [of relationship
dissolution] with objective probabilities in mind.”89 If both
bargaining parties were indeed “factually” autonomous and
were always capable of conducting “rational cost-benefit
analyses,”90 then Bastarche J’s comments would be apt and
appropriate; hence the need to ensure that both parties in a
given case are indeed autonomous before deferring to the
parties’ intentions as expressed in a domestic contract.
This concern to ensure parties’ autonomy concurs
with a trend in how courts have come to interpret Miglin
approximately a decade after its release, as observed by
87
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Carol Rogerson. That interpretation is that “fairly
negotiated” or “reasonable agreements” should be upheld,
as opposed to respecting and upholding final agreements
without qualification. 91 This interpretation, insofar as
courts may have limited it to separation agreements, can be
extended to the realm of domestic contracts simply by
adopting the two-pronged approach suggested in this
paper.
CONCLUSION
The courts’ analyses in McCain and Barton suggest a way
to reconcile the apparent tension between the principles of
autonomy and fairness in the context of domestic contracts.
The above two-pronged approach ensures that parties
involved in domestic contractual bargaining are truly
autonomous. This safeguards Hartshorne’s effort to
preserve individual autonomy while simultaneously
making space for LeVan’s concern for fairness, thus
finding harmony amid two principles that at first glance
seem diametrically opposed.
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